--- title: Rofson Disposable Goods Import Business type: article created: '2026-04-05' updated: '2026-04-05' source_docs: - raw/2026-01-15-complimentary-strategy-session-steve-dersch-114704648.md tags: - food-service - import - distribution - disposable-goods - gloves - b2b - rofson layer: 2 client_source: null industry_context: food-beverage transferable: true --- # Rofson Disposable Goods Import Business Rofson.com is a Houston-based importer of disposable goods sourced primarily from Asia, selling to distributors across the 48 contiguous United States. Founded in 1963, the company has grown from $20M to $50M in revenue since 2013 and operates under a B2B model focused on food service end users and their distributors. See also: [[clients/rofson/index]] | [[meetings/2026-04-05-rofson-discovery-call]] --- ## Company Snapshot | Attribute | Detail | |---|---| | Website | rofson.com | | Revenue (current) | ~$50M | | Revenue target | $70–75M in 8–10 years | | Growth rate | ~8–10% annually | | Primary contact | Steve Dersch (steve@rofson.com) | | Headquarters | Houston, TX | | Warehouses | 3 locations | | Brands | Rofson; Sandy Sure (gloves) | --- ## Import Operations ### Volume & Ports Rofson moves approximately **450–500 forty-foot containers per year**, split across two primary US entry points: - **Houston** — ~60% of volume; containers are drayed to Rofson's own warehouses - **Savannah** — ~40% of volume; at least one large customer receives direct container deliveries All containers are **floor-loaded**, requiring manual unloading and palletization at the receiving warehouse — a meaningful labor cost embedded in the logistics chain. ### Sourcing Origins Product is sourced from six to eight factories across several Chinese manufacturing hubs: - **Qingdao** — primary exit port for gloves (manufactured in Shandong province) - **Shenzhen** - **Guangzhou** - **Daoyun** - **Shanghai** — minor volume only ### Freight Forwarders Rofson works with three freight forwarders (one China-based, two California-based), allocating volume based on a combination of price, service level, and relationship history. Allocation shifts over time; one forwarder was reduced from ~50% to ~15% of business due to uncompetitive pricing. --- ## Product Mix Gloves dominate the portfolio by volume. The full product lineup is: | Category | Products | Share of Volume | |---|---|---| | **Gloves** | Vinyl, nitrile, poly (no latex) | ~65% | | **Bamboo** | Chopsticks, toothpicks, decorative/artillery picks | Significant | | **Stirrers** | Wood and bamboo coffee stirrers | Significant | | **Plastic** | Picks and miscellaneous plastic items | Minor | The glove line is sold under the **Sandy Sure** trademark. All other products ship under the **Rofson** brand. --- ## Distribution & Sales Model Rofson does not sell direct to end users in a fulfillment sense — it sells *through* distributors. However, its sales motion is end-user-first: 1. Rofson (via internal sales, brokers, or influencers) builds a relationship with a food service end user (e.g., a restaurant chain or institutional buyer) 2. The end user instructs their existing distributor to carry Rofson's products 3. The distributor becomes the fulfillment channel This means **~80% of Rofson's commercial relationships are with end users**, even though physical product moves through distributors. ### Why Not Direct-to-Distributor? Pursuing distributors for their "street business" (stocking products speculatively for their own sales reps to push) is considered low-value. Rofson's margins are thin, and distributors prioritize higher-margin lines. The end-user pull model gives Rofson more control over placement and pricing. ### E-Commerce E-commerce is intentionally minimal. A partner called **KTOM** handles essentially all of Rofson's e-com activity, but the total volume is negligible. The business model requires scale — customers ordering 10,000–30,000 cases per month — which is incompatible with parcel-level e-commerce economics. --- ## Cost Structure & Key Challenges ### Freight Costs (~20% of COGS) The single largest operational concern is freight. Combined ocean and overland freight represents approximately **20% of cost of goods sold** across 450–500 containers annually. This figure is actively monitored and considered the most pressing cost-control issue. Contributing factors include: - Floor-loaded containers requiring manual labor at receiving - Three warehouse locations to serve - Dependence on spot and contract ocean rates ### Broker Inefficiency Brokers are used as a sales channel but underperform because Rofson's low-margin products do not generate attractive commissions. Brokers naturally prioritize higher-commission items, making them an unreliable growth lever. ### Growth Ceiling on Current Model The current "push" sales model (outbound sales + brokers + influencers, no marketing) has successfully grown the business but is showing limits. Reaching the $70–75M target will require new approaches, including pull marketing and potentially new product categories. --- ## Strategic Context Rofson competes in a mature, low-growth market. Revenue growth comes primarily from **taking market share**, not from market expansion. The value proposition is: - Competitive (not lowest) price - Consistent quality - Reliable in-stock availability - Strong service The company has historically kept a very low marketing profile — a deliberate posture carried over from a service philosophy of "no news is good news." Leadership now recognizes this needs to change to hit the next growth milestone. A [[meetings/2026-04-05-rofson-discovery-call|discovery call with AAG]] in early 2026 identified pull marketing and a formal growth strategy session as the proposed next steps. --- ## Related - [[clients/rofson/index]] - [[meetings/2026-04-05-rofson-discovery-call]] - [[knowledge/strategy/push-vs-pull-marketing]] - [[knowledge/food-beverage/food-service-distribution-model]]